Class War in America: the Book |
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The
Great Debate, and
a New Conservative Strategy As of the end of 1999, wealthy conservatives could hardly believe their good fortune. It seemed too good to last. For the previous 20 years: §
The
U.S. economy had been growing, §
Worker
productivity had been going up, §
Corporate
profits had been going up, §
The
stock market had been skyrocketing, §
Unemployment
had been going down, and §
To
everyone’s feigned surprise—workers’ wages had been steadily losing pace
with inflation. Conservatives
had told the public that, under these conditions, this last development
was never supposed to happen. Thus, the great debate: Is this good fortune
for investors too good to last without workers’ incomes starting to
rise? Despite
the recent consensus that there is less need now to raise the prime to
control wages, it’s instructive to review the debate as it has progressed
over the years: Should the Fed raise the prime interest rate in order to
slow the economy, drive unemployment up and, thus, stomp out even the
remote possibility that workers’ may begin sharing in the prosperity of
our country? Or are there other ways to destroy workers’ incomes without
having to rely on manipulating the prime? In
the next few pages, note how our cold-blooded Wall Street barbarians have
been debating the economic fate of working Americans in the era of
ClintoReaganonomics. In the view of today’s financial
conservatives: §
Workers
are in a category that is no different from machinery or raw materials,
therefore, §
They
are an expense to be minimized—or totally eliminated if possible. §
The
growing income gap between rich investors and executives—and middle- and
low-income workers—is irrelevant. §
Conservatives
also consider it irrelevant that: §
Workers
are human beings who are citizens of this country, with this country’s standard of living,
and this country’s cost of
living, §
Workers
have families to support, §
Workers
have medical bills, house payments and school ex-penses to pay,
and §
Workers
built the very corporations that are now abandoning or victimizing
them. All
that counts to America’s financial elite are corporate profits and their
own incomes. Therefore, the only consideration in this debate has been:
What is the best way to keep working Americans’ incomes from going up, and still continue the growing
income and wealth disparity between the top 20% of Americans and everyone
else? The
Wall Street Journal gave
us a brief introduction to the debate when it reported that “Business and
Academia Clash Over a Concept: ‘Natural’ Jobless
Rate”: Are
too many Americans at work these days for the econ-omy’s own good?
Absolutely says Martin Feldstein…. “We are…into the danger zone.”
“Nonsense,” retorts Dana Mead…. “Economists who talk that way…don’t
understand how American companies have tied wage increases to productivity
gains, shifted work overseas and learned to produce more with fewer
people.”1
Realize
what these two modern conservatives are debating here. The “natural”
jobless rate occurs when unemployment is high enough to keep wages of
working Americans from going up, but not so high that corporations can’t
make huge profits. Feldstein
claimed that unemployment was getting into the danger zone (too low), and maybe the Fed
should raise interest rates. Raising interest rates would slow down the
economy, jobs would be scarcer, and wages would
stagnate. Mead
disagreed: Because of our nation’s conservative economic policies,
corporations have better ways to put pressure on wages to keep them
down—and still allow corporate profits to grow. Business
Week described
Alan Greenspan’s now-discredited 1995 view of the debate, under the head,
“Can the Economy Stand a Million More Jobs?”: Despite growing comfort at the Fed with
the current jobless rate, Greenspan remains the biggest skeptic. Fed
watchers say that he still doubts the economy can handle unemployment
lower than 6% without triggering wage pressures. Greenspan
hinted as much in an Oct. 19 speech, noting that while the downsizing
trend has left employees docile, at some point “workers will perceive that
it no longer makes sense to trade off wage progress for incremental gains
in expected job security.”2 Obviously,
in Greenspan’s view the economic welfare of working Americans takes a
distant second place to high corporate profits. He isn’t concerned about
outrageous incomes of the wealthy; he is concerned only about microscopic
wage increases of working Americans. He even took comfort in the fact that
downsizing had kept workers docile. But he worried that their attitudes
may change if they figure out that just having a job isn’t enough, if
their wages don’t go up. In
1997, after two more years of stagnant wages and soaring corporate
profits, The Wall Street Journal
described how Greenspan had changed his opinion. Under the head, “In
Setting Fed’s Policy, Chairman Bets Heavily on His Own Judgment,” it
explained that Despite
a rebound in economic growth, wages and prices remain, so far, amazingly
placid.… Mr. Greenspan [now] has a
different mantra: Workers’ fear of losing their jobs restrains them
from seeking the pay raises that usually crop up when employers have
trouble finding people to hire. Even if the economy didn’t slow down as he
expected, he told a Fed colleague last summer, he saw little danger of a
sudden upturn in wages and prices.
“Because workers are
more worried about their own job security and their marketability if
forced to change jobs, they are apparently accepting smaller increases in
their compensation at any given level of labor-market tightness,” Mr.
Greenspan told Congress at the time.3 As
all the major financial publications were pointing out, Republicans
and conservative Democrats had created a new world economy. Workers’ fear
of losing their jobs prevented them from seeking pay raises, so, even if
the economy didn’t slow down, there was little danger of wages going up.
Thus, Greenspan’s “different mantra.” Barron’s
Op-ed Heavyweights Now
read what two economic heavyweights had to say in Barron’s about the great debate.
Under the headline, “Forget NAIRU”
(Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment), Gene Epstein
explained why the old “Goldilocks” theory of traditional conservatives is
now invalid: Joblessness
can fall without boosting inflation.… The idea of the NAIRU is based on
the theory that there’s a “Goldilocks” rate of unemployment—not too hot,
not too cold—at which inflation will stabilize. The theory was sparked by
concern that a low jobless rate can cause such an acute mismatch of
geography and skills that wages start to rise, touching off an
acceleration rise in prices.… [Joseph Stiglitz, chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisors]…implicitly gave advice to his
colleague, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan: Try easing interest rates and
bringing unemployment down. Don’t worry, because if inflation starts to
jump, you can always retrace your steps and see it decline
again.4 The
reason Stiglitz was so euphoric is that highly skilled “Baby Boomers” were
entering the labor force. They were more adaptable to new and different
jobs, and were more willing to go to where the jobs were, thus increasing
competition for high-skilled jobs. He also noted that the labor market was
more competitive and less unionized, which forced unions to reduce their
demands. Translation:
In the past, conservatives manipulated the prime to keep the economy hot
enough to maximize profits, but not so hot that wages would go up (the
Goldilocks strategy). But, by using other methods and because of other
factors, they’ve been able to force unions to reduce their demands, thus
removing a traditional upward pressure on the wages of everyone, even
non-union workers. And—here’s
the best part—if workers should accidentally start making higher wages,
the Fed can always “retrace its steps and reverse its course” (by raising
the prime, and, hence, increasing the unemployment
rate). Offering
a contrary opinion, Charles Lieberman defended the more traditional way of
keeping wages down by raising the prime. In a Barron’s headline, he asked “Is
Inflation Dead?” and warned that “In fact, it may be right around the
corner”:
The
service sector now accounts for 80% of total non- agricultural payroll
employment in the United States, and these jobs are exposed to little
international competition. If there’s a shortage of truck drivers who
travel between Boston and New York, the availability of unemployed truck
drivers between Rome and Milan, or Tokyo and Yokahama, or Santos and Sao
Paulo, is totally irrelevant…. Low value-added
manufacturing like that of clothing, toys and shoes long ago mainly moved
to low-wage countries. There is nearly an unlimited supply of such
products and they can be imported at low prices. But importing them
doesn’t relieve any manufacturing capacity problems here because the U.S.
no longer makes many of these items.5 Lieberman
went on to disagree with his optimistic colleagues who felt the prime rate
didn’t need to be raised because foreign labor has become a satisfactory
substitute: The U.S. can’t count on “low value-added manufacturing” imports to continue to lower
wages, because we gave away those industries long ago! They’re history and
no longer relevant. Lieberman
also wrote that “much of our labor force is in the service sector and not
subject to international competition.” He was clearly wrong on that point.
Three years after his op-ed piece—and as recently as May, 1999—service
sector employees were still suffering from a severe case of creeping
wages. As Business Week put it
in its “All This and Low Wage Pressures, Too”: Productivity
is up, unemployment down, and the Fed can bide its
time…. Given the solid growth in
service jobs, it is remarkable that service companies are not bidding up
wages faster. The explanation may be that, the low unemployment rate
notwithstanding, the demand for labor across the entire economy may be
easing and the supply is rising. How so? First of all, the
loss of 407,000 factory jobs during the past year creates a fresh supply
of workers for the service sector.6 The
working Americans who lost the jobs that went overseas are now quite
willing to fill any demand for
service jobs, as well as any “shortage of truck drivers who travel between
Boston and New York,” who, incidentally, have seen their hourly income
drop from $16 to $9 an hour. The
Great Debate Continues No
matter how much wages stagnate—and due to the chronic insecurity of greedy
and materialistic conservatives—the great debate will likely continue ad infinitum. As recently as
December, 1999, The Wall Street
Journal proclaimed that “Even-Lower Jobless Rate May Not Ignite
Inflation,” and cited a Department of Labor study which suggested
that The
national unemployment rate—already at 4.1%, a 29- year low—might safely
sink even further without dragging the economy into an inflationary
spiral…. A
few economists have abandoned the idea of a safe floor for unemployment
altogether. Many others have retained the idea of a safe floor and simply
lowered it.7 So, again, the great debate among
modern economists has nothing to do with the welfare of American workers.
It’s still about the best way to make investors richer by keeping wages
from going up. All that seems to change in this controversy is that the
“safe floor” for an acceptable level of unemployment keeps ratcheting
lower. To
get a better understanding of why lower unemployment in a growing economy
doesn’t cause wages to rise higher than inflation, or even as high as
inflation, consider another wrinkle in the conservative con: The stealth
Catch-22 and why economic growth no longer counts. Now go to:
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